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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rise in cell phone usage in the United States, texting while 
driving has grown to become a pervasive form of distracted driving, 
which has created a major public safety issue with much of the focus 
only on the conduct of the driver.1 Texting, because of its inherently 
distracting and mobile nature,2 poses a serious and potentially deadly 
risk of harm to others when coupled with the operation of a motor 
vehicle.3 To illustrate, in 2013, cell phone related accidents constituted 
27 percent of all automobile accidents.4 Further, it is estimated that 
341,000 of those accidents were related to texting and driving,5 where 
411 of those crashes resulted in fatalities.6 These figures demonstrate 
how a driver substantially increases the likelihood of causing an accident 
when he uses a cell phone to view or send texts, which exposes the 
driver to liability while the text sender generally bears no responsibility.7 
*J.D. Candidate, the University of Akron School of Law, 2017. Production Editor, 2016-2017 
Akron Law Review. B.A., Political Science, Kent State University, 2013. 
1. Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic Devices,
78 Fed. Reg. 24818, 24824-25 [hereinafter NHTSA] (proposed April 26, 2013) (not to be codified) 
(noting that the widespread popularity or use of text messaging began to rise after 2004). 
2. Id. at 24820 (stating that the NHTSA believes that the task of text messaging inherently
interferes with a driver’s ability to safely control a vehicle). 
3. See Joseph B. Bayer & Scott W. Campbell, Texting while Driving on Automatic:
Considering the Frequency-Independent Side of Habit, 28 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2083, 2083 
(2012) (noting that texting while driving is absurd because “[i]n addition to operating the vehicle’s 
interface, obeying travel laws, traversing traffic, and locating destinations, the texting individual is 
required to pinpoint and retrieve his or her mobile device, situate the current conversation, and 
devise an appropriately human message . . .”). 
4. Annual Estimate of Cell Phone Crashes 2013, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL (2015), 
http://www.nsc.org/DistractedDrivingDocuments/Cell-Phone-Estimate-Summary-2013.pdf. 
5. Id.
6. NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REP. NO. DOT HS 812 132, 
DISTRACTED DRIVING 2013 (2015) (reporting that 411 distraction-affected crashes resulting in 
fatalities involved the use of a cell phone). 
7. But see Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2013) (addressing the issue
2
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Because texting requires the participation of at least two 
individuals, the driver should not be held solely liable while the sender 
of the text shares no liability.8 While a driver owes a duty of reasonable 
care not to become distracted by an incoming text, if the sender of the 
text is aware that the driver is likely to become distracted by it, she 
should have a limited duty not to send that text.9 For example, in June of 
2015, James Davenport, a school bus driver, “was driving while 
distracted due to sending and receiving text messages,” veered into 
oncoming traffic and collided with another school bus, killing two 
students and a teacher’s aide.10 If the text sender was aware that the bus 
driver, who may have owed a heightened duty of care to his passengers, 
was driving a school bus during the exchange of texts, the victims of 
such a needless tragedy should be able to seek redress from both parties 
who engaged in the texting activity.11 
Recently in Kubert v. Best, the Superior Court of New Jersey 
properly extended potential liability not merely to the driver who causes 
an accident due to texting and driving, but also to the sender of the 
text.12 Kubert’s holding represents a departure from traditional notions 
of third-party tort liability and imposes a new duty on remote senders of 
text messages.13 While the Superior Court concluded that the evidence 
presented by the Kuberts was insufficient to hold the remote text sender 
liable, it held that “the sender of a text message can potentially be liable 
if an accident is caused by texting, but only if the sender knew or had 
special reason to know that the recipient would view the text while 
driving and thus become distracted.”14 
This Article argues that states should extend liability to text senders 
of whether a remote text sender may be held liable for an automobile accident caused by the 
recipient); see also Phillip N. Quisenberry, Texting and Driving: Can it be Explained by the General 
Theory of Crime?, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 303, 303 (2014) (“At least one study found that drivers 
who text are 23 times more likely to crash relative to non-distracted drivers.”).  
8. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 503. 
9. See id. (holding that a remote text sender has a duty not to send a driver a text in limited
circumstances).  
10. David Bailey, Tennessee Bus Driver Was Texting before Deadly Crash, REUTERS (June 
5, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/05/us-usa-tennessee-crash-
idUSKBN0OL2EI20150605. 
11. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW 158 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012)
(noting that “commercial and governmental operators of . . . buses . . . have long been held to owe 
their passengers greater-than-ordinary care”).  
12. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 503 (“[T]he sender of a text message can potentially be
liable if an accident is caused by texting, but only if the sender knew or had special reason to know 
that the recipient would view the text while driving and thus be distracted.”). 
13. Id.
14. Id. at 503. 
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to provide victims of accidents caused by texting and driving with an 
alternative mechanism of redress. Part II discusses empirical evidence 
that demonstrates the societal harm caused by texting and driving and 
provides the legislative background concerning the steps that states have 
already taken to reduce texting while driving. Part III discusses the 
holding, facts, and the “full duty analysis” that the New Jersey Superior 
Court employed in Kubert v. Best to impose a new duty on remote text 
senders.15 Part IV argues that state legislatures and courts should 
establish rules that impose a duty on remote persons to avoid sending 
text messages to drivers if they know that the driver will view the text 
and become distracted. Finally, Part IV also examines how a plaintiff 
might prove a remote text sender’s negligence under Kubert. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Texting and Driving Has Produced Negative Effects in Society
Empirical evidence of the negative consequences caused by
distracted driving—and specifically texting and driving—should serve 
as incentive for society to address the issue and take steps to curtail the 
unsafe activity. In the United States, approximately 899,000 automobile 
accidents were related to distracted driving in 2010, and at least 47,000 
police-reported crashes involved a driver who was distracted by an 
electronic device.16 Since then, various studies have concluded that the 
activity of texting while driving is one of the most risky forms of 
distracted driving.17 Furthermore, the economic costs imposed on 
society by accidents caused by distracted driving should further 
incentivize society to proactively reduce distracted driving. Specifically, 
a study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported 
that the economic cost of distracted driving equated to a total cost of at 
least $40 billion.18 This figure includes “losses [of] productivity, medical 
15. Id. at 517 (“Our conclusion that a limited duty should be imposed on the sender [of a
text] is supported by the “full duty analysis” described by the [New Jersey] Supreme Court . . . .”). 
16. NHTSA, supra note 1, at 24819, 24823.
17. To illustrate the distracting nature of cell phone use while driving, research has revealed
that there are three primary types of distractions that affect a driver’s ability to operate an 
automobile: visual, manual, and cognitive. A driver is visually distracted when he glances away 
from the road to “visually obtain information,” manually distracted when he removes his hand from 
the steering wheel to manipulate a device, and cognitively distracted when his mental attention is 
diverted from the task of driving. Some tasks, such as interacting with passengers or changing the 
radio station, only distract a driver in one or two ways, while texting and driving distracts a driver in 
all three ways. Id. at 24819.  
18. LAWRENCE BLINCOE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE
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costs, legal and court costs, emergency service costs, insurance 
administration costs, congestion costs, property damage, and workplace 
losses.”19 
The societal movement to decrease incidences of drinking and 
driving offers guidance on how society should approach the problem of 
texting and driving.20 Analogously, drinking and driving has resulted in 
harmful societal consequences and has been fiercely combated.21 
Particularly, over the last several decades, media campaigns, legal 
prohibitions, and heightened public awareness of the issue led to a 
decrease in accidents related to drinking and driving and, in turn, 
decreased the number of deaths caused by drinking and driving.22 To 
illustrate, alcohol related accidents that resulted in a fatality declined by 
23 percent from 13,099 in 2004 to 10,076 in 2013.23 Thus, by adopting 
similar techniques, particularly by increasing civil liability, incidences of 
accidents related to texting and driving can also be reduced. 
B. Texting-and-Driving Laws Have Been Enacted by State Legislatures
to Combat the Negative Effects of Texting and Driving
In response to the increase in accidents caused by texting and 
driving, a majority of states have enacted measures to curb the 
phenomenon in various forms.24 Currently, forty-six states have enacted 
a texting-and-driving ban for all drivers.25 For example, New Jersey has 
CRASHES, at 4 (2015). 
19. Id. at 5. 
20. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 519 (noting that the public learned of the dangers of
drinking and driving through a “sustained campaign and enhanced criminal penalties and civil 
liability”).  
21. See Steven Grossman, Hot Crimes: A Study in Excess, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 33, 47, 54-
55 (2011) (noting that advocacy groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving were successful in 
raising awareness of issues such as “the problem created by the drunk driver, the overly lenient 
sentences that many drunk drivers received at that time, and the need for new legislation”). 
22. See Marykate E. Williams, Learning from the Past to Improve the Future: Taking A
Lesson from America’s Drunk Driving Dilemma to Cure the Current Texting While Driving 
Epidemic, 41 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 253, 263 (2015) (reporting that after 
states increased the drinking age to 21, drunk driving accidents involving fatalities decreased by 53 
percent from 1982 to 2011).  
23. NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REP. NO. DOT HS 812 102, 
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING (2014). 
24. Even President Obama has taken steps to reduce texting and driving. For instance, in
2009 he issued an executive order to “demonstrate Federal leadership in improving safety on our 
roads and highways” by imposing a “Federal Government-wide prohibition on the use of text 
messaging while driving on official business or while using Government-supplied equipment.” 
Federal Leadership on Reducing Text Messaging While Driving, 74 Fed. Reg. 51225, 51225 (Oct. 
6, 2009). 
25. Distracted Driving Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N (Nov. 2015),
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enacted several statutes to suppress texting while driving. Specifically, 
New Jersey’s traffic regulation that bans texting while driving sets forth 
penalties, which, if violated, carry monetary sanctions that may be 
enhanced with each subsequent violation and may also lead to an 
operator’s license forfeiture.26 Further, partly in response to the facts 
giving rise to the litigation in Kubert v. Best, the New Jersey legislature 
enacted a provision within its criminal code known as the “Kulesh, 
Kubert, and Bolis Law.”27 The statute places severe criminal penalties 
on a defendant convicted of recklessly causing an accident resulting in 
bodily injury to another.28 Finally, the statute permits a jury to infer that 
the defendant was driving recklessly if there is sufficient proof that the 
defendant violated New Jersey’s texting-while-driving statute.29 
Conversely, some states have prohibited texting and driving for 
only certain classes of drivers. For example, Missouri places a restriction 
on texting and driving for drivers 21 years of age or younger, in lieu of 
an outright ban.30 Texas has adopted a limited ban on specific classes of 
individuals, such as drivers under 18 years of age and school bus drivers 
who are driving underage children.31 The mechanism for enforcement 
also varies by state, where most states have adopted a primary 
enforcement scheme, while others enforce texting while driving as a 
secondary offense.32 However, several states have not yet enacted 
outright prohibitions on texting while driving for all drivers. Particularly, 
states such as Arizona and Montana have not yet adopted a state-wide 
ban on texting and driving.33 
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone_laws.html [hereinafter Distracted Driving Laws] 
(“Currently, 46 states, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands ban text messaging for 
all drivers.”). 
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3(d) (West 2013) (setting forth a monetary penalty of $200-
$300 for a first violation, $400-$600 for a second violation, $600-$800 for a third violation, and a 
discretionary operator’s license forfeiture for a fourth offense).  
27. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 editors’ note (West 2012). New Jersey’s assault-by-auto 
statute states: “Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving 
a motor vehicle in violation of [New Jersey’s texting-while-driving statute] may give rise to an 
inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(c)(1) (West 2015).  
28. Assault by auto, when it involves a driver who was using a cell phone, is a fourth-degree 
crime if a person was seriously injured as a result of the accident. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(c)(2) 
(West 2014).  
29. See supra text accompanying note 27.
30. Distracted Driving Laws, supra note 25.
31. Id. 
32. Id. (noting that all but five states that ban texting while driving have primary enforcement 
schemes).  
33. Id. 
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C. Several Courts Have Extended Liability to Passengers of Motor
Vehicles
Courts in New Jersey have recognized that passengers of 
automobiles may be held liable to third-party victims for accidents 
caused by the driver of an automobile.34 Generally, while passengers 
cannot be held liable for injuries to third parties based on the negligent 
conduct of the driver, New Jersey courts have imposed a duty on 
passengers not to interfere with the driver’s operation and control of a 
motor vehicle.35 
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that a passenger 
may be held liable to an injured third party if she interferes with the 
driver’s control of the automobile through her own affirmative 
negligence.36 Specifically, conduct such as grabbing and turning the 
steering wheel, distracting the driver’s attention from the road, 
obstructing the driver’s view, and urging the driver to violate traffic 
laws, such as driving under the influence of drugs, may constitute 
conduct sufficient to demonstrate that the passenger interfered with the 
driver’s operation of the motor vehicle.37 For example, in Adams v. 
Morris, the court held that the passenger owed a duty of care to the 
third-party plaintiff after the passenger diverted the driver’s attention 
from the road when the passenger asked the driver to clean a car seat.38 
Additionally, it was held in Brainerd v. Stearns that a passenger who 
attempts to take control of an automobile by grasping the wheel may be 
held liable for negligence when that automobile causes injury to a third 
party due to an attempted commandeering of the automobile.39 Next, the 
court in Reclusado v. Mangum stated that an act that directly interferes 
34. E.g., Lombardo v. Hoag, 269 N.J. Super. 36, 54 (App. Div. 1993) (citing Lind v.
Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that a passenger may be held liable to 
a third party if he or she interferes with the driver’s ability to operate the vehicle)).  
35. Id. (“A passenger has a duty not to interfere with the operations of the driver.”).
36. See Olson v. Ische, 343 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Minn. 1984) (“A passenger who interferes
with his driver’s operation of the motor vehicle, for instance by grabbing the steering wheel, may be 
liable to others . . . .”). 
37. Gregory G. Sarno, Liability of Motor Vehicle Passenger for Accident, 50 AM. JURIS.
PROOF FACTS 2d 677 § 2 (1988).  
38. 584 S.W.2d 712, 716-17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (“[The passenger] diverted the driver’s
attention from the road by requesting him to clean up the seat . . . . Under such a state of facts and 
circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded that appellant owed a duty to . . . the [third-party] 
plaintiffs.”). 
39. 155 Wash. 364, 366, 368-70 (Wash. 1930) (“The [passenger] knew, or to him is imputed
the knowledge, that the probable consequence of [grasping the steering wheel] would be to cause an 
accident. Such disregard of consequences warranted the jury in finding the [passenger] guilty of 
gross negligence.”).  
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with a driver’s operation, such as “holding some object” in front of the 
driver’s eyes, would be a breach of a statutorily defined duty not to 
interfere with the driver’s control of an automobile.40 Finally, Price v. 
Halstead established that passengers may be liable to third parties for 
injuries caused by an intoxicated driver if the passengers substantially 
encouraged the driver’s impairment.41 
These decisions in which courts have extended liability to 
passengers may serve as an important basis for courts to extend liability 
to remote text senders. Appropriately, the Kubert court extended 
passenger liability to include remote text senders who, under 
circumstances similar to passengers that divert the driver’s attention 
from the road, interfere with the driver’s operation of the motor 
vehicle.42 
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT KUBERT V. BEST
A. Kubert’s Holding Places a New Duty on Remote Text Senders
Kubert’s holding imposes a new duty on remote text senders in
relation to the public who use the roadways.43 This holding is articulated 
in several different ways throughout the court’s opinion.44 Essentially, 
the court held that “[t]he sender of a text message can potentially be 
liable if an accident is caused by texting, but only if the sender knew or 
had special reason to know that the recipient would view the text while 
driving and thus be distracted.”45 The court explained that a sender has 
“special reason to know” based on a “personal relationship or prior 
experience that put a defendant ‘in a position’ to ‘discover the risk of 
harm.’”46 Thus, a sender will have breached a duty to the public who use 
the roadways by distracting the driver if the sender either knew or had 
40. 228 Cal.App.2d 8, 15-16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (“[A]cts which the code section is
designed to prevent . . . such as . . . blinding [the driver’s] view of the road by holding some object 
in front of his eyes . . . would be [a] breach[] of the code section.”). 
41. 177 W.Va. 592, 600 (W. Va. 1987) (“[A] passenger may be found liable for injuries to a
third party caused by the intoxication of the driver of the vehicle in which he is riding . . . .”).  
42. Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 515 (App. Div. 2013) (stating that the court imposed
liability on remote text senders by “examining the law in [the] analogous circumstance[]” of 
passenger liability).  
43. Id.
44. See id. at 495, 503, 507, 514-15, 517, 519. 
45. Id. at 503. 
46. Id. at 517 (quoting J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 338 (N.J. 1998)) (“In J.S., the Court used 
the phrase ‘special reason to know’ in reference to a personal relationship or prior experience that 
put a defendant ‘in a position’ to ‘discover the risk of harm.’”). 
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“special reason to know” that the driver would view the message while 
driving.47 
B. Factual and Procedural Background of Kubert
In Kubert, the plaintiffs, Linda and David Kubert, were riding a
motorcycle when Kyle Best, who was driving a pick-up truck, veered 
into the opposite lane and collided with the Kuberts.48 Best stopped his 
vehicle and immediately dialed 911.49 As a result of the collision, both 
Linda and David Kubert lost their left legs.50 
The Kuberts filed suit against Best in the Morris County Superior 
Court in New Jersey. In preparing for the lawsuit, the Kuberts’ attorney 
investigated Best’s actions on the day of the accident and discovered that 
Best had been in continuous communication with Shannon Colonna via 
text message and telephone throughout the day.51 While the cell-phone 
record revealed that Best and Colonna had texted each other sixty-two 
times on the day of the accident, the two defendants were not in a 
romantic relationship at the time, but were merely friends.52 Further, 
because the cell-phone record indicated that Best sent a text to Colonna 
immediately before the accident, the court reasoned that it could be 
inferred that Best replied to Colonna’s text received only thirty-five 
seconds earlier.53 Seventeen seconds after responding to Colonna’s text, 
Best called 911.54 Thus, the evidence suggested that Best must have 
collided with the Kuberts at some point during those seventeen 
seconds.55 
The Kuberts added Colonna as a defendant to the lawsuit and their 
attorney attempted to obtain the content of the text messages that were 
47. Id. (“[W]hen the sender ‘has actual knowledge or special reason to know[]’ . . .  from 
prior texting experience or otherwise, that the recipient will view the text while driving, the sender 
has breached a duty of care to the public by distracting the driver.”). 
48. Id. at 503-04. 
49. Id. at 504. 
50. Id.
51. Id. (noting that the Kuberts’ attorney “developed evidence to prove Best’s activities on
the day of the accident” and that “they texted each other many times each day . . . .”). 
52. Id. 
53. The opinion appears to contain a scrivener’s error here. Specifically, it states that only
twenty-five seconds elapsed between the time when Best received Colonna’s text at 5:48:23 and 
when Best responded with a text at 5:48:58. Id. at 506 (“It can be inferred that he sent [his] text in 
response to Colonna’s text to him that he received twenty-five seconds earlier.”). In fact, thirty-five 
seconds would have elapsed. 
54. Id. at 505. 
55. Id. at 505-06.
9
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exchanged between Best and Colonna.56 However, the Kuberts’ attorney 
did not have access to that information and neither Best’s nor Colonna’s 
depositions contained what the contents of those text messages were.57 
Eventually, Best settled and Colonna moved for summary judgment.58 
The trial court concluded that remote persons do not have a legal duty to 
avoid sending text messages to drivers, even if the remote person knows 
that the recipient is driving.59 The Kuberts appealed the trial court’s 
dismissal of their claims against Colonna to the Appellate Division of 
the New Jersey Superior Court.60 
C. The Rationale of the Kubert Decision
To reach its conclusion that the sender of a text has a limited legal
duty not to send a text in certain circumstances, the Kubert court 
engaged in the common law process of formulating a new duty under a 
“full duty analysis.”61 First, the court noted that a “duty is an obligation 
imposed by law requiring one party to conform to a particular standard 
toward another,” that defining a duty is an issue of law, and that 
“determinations of the scope of duty in negligence cases has traditionally 
been a function of the judiciary.”62 Next, the court briefly stated that 
imposing a legal duty requires balancing several factors, such as “the 
relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the 
opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the 
proposed solution.”63 Importantly, the court noted that not only does the 
imposition of a duty upon a defendant need to reach a just outcome in 
the specific circumstance, but that it must be a “generally applicable rule 
that governs societal behaviors.”64 
The court next considered the Kuberts’ argument that Colonna 
should be held liable under a theory of aiding and abetting. The Kuberts 
56. Id. at 506.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 501, 506 (“[The Kuberts’] claims for compensation from [Best] have been settled
and are no longer part of this lawsuit.”). 
59. Id. at 506-07. 
60. Id. at 501 (“Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against the driver’s 
seventeen-year-old friend who was texting the driver much of the day and sent a text message to 
him immediately before the accident.”).  
61. Id. at 509-10 (“The New Jersey Supreme Court recently analyzed the common law
process by which a court decides whether a legal duty of care exists to prevent injury to another . . . 
[and] described [this process] as ‘a full duty analysis.’”).  
62. Id. at 509, 519.
63. Id. at 510 (quoting Desir ex. rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303 (2013)).
64. Id. (quoting Desir ex. rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303 (2013)). 
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cited the Second Restatement of Torts § 876, and argued that under this 
Section “[A]n individual is liable if he or she knows that another 
person’s ‘conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the other.’”65 Under this theory, the 
Kuberts argued that Colonna was essentially “electronically present” 
when she aided and abetted Best’s use of a cell phone immediately 
before the accident.66 The court acknowledged that the Superior Court of 
New Jersey had previously adopted the principle set forth in § 876 and 
discussed two previous cases in which the Superior Court applied the 
Section to passenger liability cases.67 Specifically, in Champion ex rel. 
Ezzo v. Dunfee68 and Podias v. Mairs,69 the court examined whether 
passengers of a vehicle could be held liable if an injury resulted from the 
driver’s negligent conduct, and the court discussed each seriatim. 
Champion set forth two exceptions to the general rule that a 
passenger does not owe a duty to other passengers and thus permits one 
passenger of a vehicle to recover against a defendant passenger under 
either of two conditions.70 First, recovery is permitted if there is a 
“special relationship” that exists between the passenger and driver which 
allows the passenger to have control over the actions of the driver.71 
Second, recovery is permitted if the passenger “substantially encourages 
or assists” the driver to engage in negligent behavior.72 However, the 
Kubert court found that the defendant neither had a special relationship 
with the driver nor actively encouraged the driver to text while driving 
and concluded that merely sending a text does not constitute “active 
encouragement” because it does not urge the driver to immediately view 
the text.73 
In Podias v. Mairs, the court considered “whether passengers in a 
65. Id. at 510. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). 
66. Id. at 511 (“Although Colonna was at a remote location from the site of the accident,
plaintiffs say she was ‘electronically present’ in Best’s pick-up truck immediately before the 
accident and she aided and abetted his unlawful use of his cell phone.”).  
67. Id. at 510-13. 
68. 398 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2008).
69. 394 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2007).
70. Champion, 398 N.J. Super. at 121-22.
71. Id. (“A special relationship exists where the occupant has some control over the driver, as 
where the driver is in the occupant’s employ or where they are engaged in a joint enterprise or 
venture.”). 
72. Id. at 122 (“The other recognized exception to the rule of passenger non-liability is where 
the passenger substantially encourages or assists in the driver’s tortious conduct.”).  
73. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 512 (“Colonna did not have a special relationship with
Best . . . [and] the act of sending [text] messages, by itself, is not active encouragement that the 
recipient read the text and respond immediately, that is, while driving and in violation of the law.”). 
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car may, in certain circumstances, owe a duty to a pedestrian struck by a 
driver who is either unwilling or unable to seek emergency aid or 
assistance himself.”74 Adopting § 876 of the Second Restatement, the 
court concluded that third parties may be held liable on an aiding and 
abetting theory if the third party gives “substantial assistance” or 
encourages the driver to leave the scene of an accident and causes the 
driver to neglect fulfilling his duty to assist the injured party.75 However, 
in Kubert, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove 
that Colonna “took affirmative steps and gave substantial assistance to 
[the driver] in violating the law.”76 Thus, the court concluded that 
Colonna could not be held liable for aiding and abetting the driver’s 
negligent conduct.77 
While neither of these cases persuaded the court that a duty should 
be imposed on the remote sender of a text under an aiding and abetting 
theory, the court continued its analysis without reference to the party’s 
arguments under an alternative theory of liability that runs analogous to 
passenger liability.78 The court began by citing the Second Restatement 
of Torts § 303, which states that “[a]n act is negligent if the actor intends 
it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect, the 
conduct of another, third person, or an animal in such a manner as to 
create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other.”79 Further, the court 
offers an illustration of this concept, which states: “A is driving through 
heavy traffic. B, a passenger in the back seat, suddenly and unnecessarily 
calls out to A, diverting his attention, thus causing him to run into the car 
of C. B is negligent toward C.”80 Based on this illustration, the court 
expanded the scope of passenger liability by imposing a duty to avoid 
unreasonably risky conduct that the passenger knows or has special 
reason to know will distract the driver, such as urging the driver to 
74. Podias, 394 N.J. Super. at 343.
75. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 513 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979)) (“We [have] held that the passengers could be found liable for giving ‘substantial 
assistance’ to the driver in failing to fulfill his legal duty to remain at the scene of the accident and 
to notify the police.”). 
76. Id.
77. Id. (“The evidence available to plaintiffs is not sufficient to prove Colonna’s liability to 
the Kuberts on the basis of aiding and abetting Best’s negligent driving while using a cell phone.”). 
78. Id. at 515-18 (“When the sender knows that the text will reach the driver while operating
a vehicle, the sender has a relationship to the public who use the roadways similar to that of a 
passenger physically present in the vehicle.”).   
79. Id. at 515 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
80. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW
INST. 1965)).  
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remove his gaze from the road to view a cell phone screen.81 
Finally, the court states that foreseeability, a “foundational 
element” in determining whether a duty exists, is “based on the 
defendant’s knowledge of the risk of injury.”82 Next, the court reasoned 
that the sender of a text takes a foreseeable risk if the sender is aware 
that the recipient is driving and will view the text immediately.”83 
Therefore, the court concluded that if a person sends a text to a recipient 
when the sender has either actual knowledge or special reason to know 
that the recipient is driving and will read the text, then the sender has, 
like a passenger, “knowingly engaged in distracting conduct” and has 
breached the duty of care owed to the public who use the roadways.84 
D. The Concurring Opinion’s Disagreement with the Majority’s Holding
Should Be Afforded Minimal Weight
Judge Espinosa delivered a concurring opinion in which she 
concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the majority’s holding that 
established a new duty rule for remote text senders.85 The concurrence 
began by emphasizing individual liability and argued that it should be 
the sole responsibility of the driver to avoid distractions.86 Further, it 
stated that the majority improperly equates passengers with remote text 
senders because the remote sender “lacks firsthand knowledge of the 
circumstances attendant to the driver’s operation of the vehicle that a 
passenger possesses and has even less ability to control the actions of the 
driver.”87 While Judge Espinosa concedes that the threshold of the new 
duty rule is so high that it will rarely be satisfied, essentially she opined 
that because traditional tort principles provide a sufficient analytical 
81. Id. at 515-18 (“[A] passenger must avoid distracting the driver. The remote sender of a
text who knows the recipient is then driving must do the same.”).  
82. Id. at 516 (quoting Podias v. Mairs, 394 N.J. Super. 338, 350 (App. Div. 2007); J.S. v.
R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 337 (1998)) (“Foreseeability of the risk of harm is the foundational element in 
the determination of whether a duty exists . . . . Foreseeability, in turn, is based on the defendant’s 
knowledge of the risk of injury.”).  
83. Id. at 517. 
84. Id. (“[I]f the sender knows that the recipient is both driving and will read the text
immediately . . . [t]he sender has knowingly engaged in distracting conduct, and it is not unfair also 
to hold the sender responsible for the distraction.”). 
85. Id. at 520 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“I do not agree that it is necessary for us to
articulate a new duty specific to persons in remote locations who send text messages to 
drivers . . . .”). 
86. Id. at 520-21 (quoting Podias v. Mairs, 394 N.J. Super. 338, 346 (App. Div. 2007))
(“Traditional tort theory emphasizes individual liability, which is to say that each particular 
defendant who is to be charged with responsibility must be proceeding negligently.”).  
87. Id. at 521.
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framework for approaching the issue of remote text sender liability, it 
was unnecessary for the majority to articulate a new duty rule.88 
To demonstrate how basic tort principles should be the sole guide 
of a court’s analysis when determining whether a remote text sender will 
be held liable, the concurrence applied the passenger liability analysis 
formulated under Champion to the case at bar.89 In Kubert, because there 
existed no “special relationship” between the remote sender and the 
recipient-driver, this exception to passenger non-liability was not 
present, and so the concurrence proceeded with its analysis under an 
aiding and abetting theory based on the Second Restatement of Torts § 
876.90 In particular, the concurrence focused on the third element of 
aiding and abetting under the Second Restatement, which requires that 
the defendant “knowingly and substantially assist the principal 
violation.”91 To determine whether substantial assistance was present in 
a particular case, the comment to the Second Restatement lists five 
factors, including whether the defendant was present or absent at the 
time of the commission of the tort.92 The concurrence argued that 
because a remote text sender will not be physically present in the 
automobile when the tort is committed, “at least” this one factor would 
weigh against holding the sender liable.93 The concurrence reasoned that 
only a passenger, unlike a remote sender, can be aware of the 
circumstances regarding the driver’s situation, and so only passengers 
can be aware of the risks created by the driver’s conduct, whereas a 
remote person who is not physically present cannot.94 
However, there are several difficulties with the concurrence’s 
88. Id. at 520 (“In my view, traditional tort principles provide adequate guidance to
determine whether liability should be imposed in such circumstances.”). 
89. Id. at 522.
90. Id. at 522-23 (“As the majority opinion notes, the type of ‘special relationship,’ such as 
parent-child, master-servant, landlord-tenant, and guardian-ward, required to impose liability for the 
conduct of another . . . was not present here.”). 
91. Id. (quoting Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 876(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).  
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (listing five
considerations, including “the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the 
defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other and his state of 
mind”). 
93. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 523 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979)) (“When the tort is the driver’s use of text 
messaging, it is evident that at least one of the factors—the remote texter’s absence from the 
location of the tort—will weigh against liability.”) (emphasis added).  
94. Id. (citing Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 398 N.J. Super. 112, 122-23 (App. Div.
2008)) (“[T]he passenger’s presence in the automobile provide[s] an awareness of the circumstances 
that contribute[s] to the risk created by the driver’s conduct.”). 
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analysis of this particular factor under the theory of aiding and abetting. 
First, even if the remote sender is not physically present in the vehicle, 
the driver is most likely operating a vehicle to reach a destination, which 
will require the driver to operate a vehicle on a public road. Thus, if the 
remote sender is aware that the recipient is driving, this should give the 
remote sender sufficient “awareness of the circumstances” that there will 
likely be other drivers in the recipient’s immediate proximity, regardless 
of whether the sender has “first-hand knowledge” based on his physical 
presence.95 Also, while the sender’s absence may weigh against liability 
according to the Second Restatement’s comment, this is only one of five 
factors that help determine whether the sender substantially assisted the 
driver’s negligent conduct.96 Therefore, regardless of whether the text 
sender is physically present in the vehicle, if a potential plaintiff is able 
to prove that the sender had knowledge that the recipient was both 
driving and was likely to view the message and become distracted, the 
sender has sufficient awareness of the circumstances because negligent 
driving upon a public highway almost certainly carries an inherent risk 
of injury to others.97 
Moreover, the concurring opinion misconstrued the premise of the 
majority’s holding when it states that “knowledge a text message will 
‘reach the driver while operating the vehicle,’ without more, places the 
remote text sender in a position equivalent to that of a passenger in the 
vehicle.”98 This misstatement lacks the other essential component 
regarding the sender’s state of mind because the sender must not only 
know that the recipient is driving, but also that the recipient will view 
the text and thereby become distracted.99 Consequently, when the 
concurrence proceeds to analyze whether Colonna would be held liable 
under an aiding and abetting theory, this important requirement is 
overlooked. Particularly, when evaluating whether Colonna was aware 
that she was assisting the driver’s tortious conduct, the concurrence’s 
95. Id. at 521.
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (noting that
several factors should be considered in determining whether the “assistance of or participation by 
the defendant may be so slight that he is not liable for the act of [another]”). 
97. To illustrate this inherent risk, in 2010 there were approximately 5,409,000 police-
reported crashes in the United States. NHTSA, supra note 1, at 24818, 24823-25 tbl.1. Visual-
Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic Devices, 78 Fed. 
Reg.24818, 24823-25 tbl.1 (proposed April 26, 2013) (not to be codified).  
98. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 521 (Espinosa, J., concurring). 
99. Id. at 515-16 (majority opinion) (“[A]dditional proofs are necessary to establish the
sender’s liability, namely, that the sender also knew or had special reason to know that the driver 
would read the message while driving and would thus be distracted from attending to the road and 
the operation of the vehicle.”).  
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analysis focused on whether she knew that she was “substantially 
assist[ing]” the conduct.100 In contrast, Kubert’s holding permits courts 
to hold a remote sender liable when faced with evidence that the sender 
merely knew or had special reason to know that the driver was likely to 
view the text and become distracted.101 Thus, while the standard of 
evidence proving the requisite state of mind under Kubert might be 
lower than under an aiding and abetting theory, it is more realistic in 
terms of deterring a text sender’s detrimental behavior, and as the 
concurrence concedes, “will rarely be met.”102 
Lastly, the concurrence states that the legislature has recognized the 
risk of harm associated with texting and driving and has acted when it 
amended its assault by auto statute.103 In the concurrence’s view, 
because the legislature’s action addressed only the conduct of the driver 
and failed to establish any civil or criminal liability for a remote sender, 
the legislature would disapprove of the majority’s extension of liability 
to remote text senders.104 However, as the concurrence concedes, while 
there was no indication in the record that the legislature would have 
extended liability, indication that the legislature considered the precise 
issue is similarly absent.105 This argument essentially relies on 
legislative inaction, which is generally a relatively weak indicator of 
legislative intent.106 
Absent legislative action, at common law it is generally the role of 
the court to impose a new duty in the face of “changing social relations 
and exigencies and man’s relation to his fellows.”107 In light of text 
100. Id. at 525 (Espinosa, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 503 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 520 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“[T]he bar set by the majority for the imposition of
liability is high and will rarely be met since the duty created arises when the conduct of a person, 
not in an automobile, interferes with the driver’s operation of the vehicle.”). 
103. Id. at 525-26; see also supra text accompanying note 32.
104. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 525-26 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“We have nothing before us
that reflects whether the Legislature considered legislation that would have imposed either civil 
liability or criminal penalties for a remote texter who sends a distracting text message to a driver.”). 
105. See id. at 525. 
106. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) (“Ordinarily, and quite
appropriately, courts are slow to attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on particular 
legislation.”); see also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional 
Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 429 (1992) (“The United 
States Supreme Court generally gives little weight to legislative inaction, since a variety of 
reasons . . . may account for the inaction.”). 
107. See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 158 (1981) (noting that the legislature’s 
refusal to impose liability on a defendant is not dispositive because the “drawing of the parameters 
of tort liability has historically been a matter of common law”); Essex v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 166 N.J. 
Super. 124, 127 (App. Div. 1979) (explaining how the existence of a duty at law must be flexible to 
adapt to changing social conditions).  
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messaging, an unprecedented method of communication that has 
changed the relationships between members of society in ways that no 
other form of communication could have prepared the law for, it is 
reasonable for courts to impose a duty on remote text senders in 
response to the foreseeable dangers that texting and driving may 
potentially produce.108 Consequently, a lack of legislative action 
regarding a text sender’s liability should not dissuade a court from 
imposing a duty on remote text senders because, even if a legislature’s 
policy differs from that of the court, legislatures are empowered to 
overturn a court’s decision if it be the will of the people.109 
IV. STATES SHOULD PERMIT VICTIMS OF ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY
TEXTING AND DRIVING TO RECOVER AGAINST REMOTE TEXT SENDERS 
A. States Should Adopt Rules That Impose a Duty on Remote Text
Senders
State courts and legislatures should, in a manner similar to that of 
Kubert, hold that remote persons have a duty to avoid sending text 
messages to drivers if they know or have special reason to know that the 
driver will view the text and become distracted.110 For the purposes of 
predictability, state legislatures should enact legislation that defines the 
contours of the new duty, which will provide potential plaintiffs with a 
cause of action and will provide the public with the opportunity to avoid 
behaviors that will open themselves up to liability. 
As Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, “[A]ny legal standard must, in 
theory, be capable of being known. When a man has to pay damages, he 
is supposed to have broken the law, and he is further supposed to have 
known what the law was.”111 For a sender to have notice of the 
circumstances in which he might be held liable for texting a driver, he 
should be able to turn to an unambiguous statement of the law. As an 
illustration, New Jersey’s statute banning texting while driving sets forth 
the contours of liability for drivers who violate the statute.112 This allows 
108. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 519 (“[T]he public interest requires fair measures to deter
dangerous texting while driving.”). 
109. For example, tort reform acts passed by the New Jersey Legislature alter tort principles
traditionally formulated at common law. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West 2015) 
(altering the recovery of damages under comparative negligence).  
110. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 519 (noting that the issue of texting and driving will “become 
part of the public consciousness when the liability of those involved matches the seriousness of the 
harm”).  
111. OLIVER W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 111 (1881). 
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:4-97:3 (West 2013) (describing the prohibited conduct under New
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drivers to conform their conduct in accordance with this statute to avoid 
liability. 
B Remote Text Sender’s Duty Aligns with the Parameters Set Forth in 
Palsgraf 
The relational aspects of breach and duty set forth in Kubert 
properly align in a manner consistent with Palsgraf so that a remote text 
sender may indeed breach a duty of care to the public who use the 
roadways. In Palsgraf, Judge Cardozo introduced the notion that the 
elements of breach and duty must align for a plaintiff to recover even if 
the defendant’s conduct actually causes the plaintiff’s injury.113 The 
events in Palsgraf take place at a train station where the guard of a 
railroad car pushed a gentleman carrying a package.114 The contents of 
the package, unbeknownst to all because of its modest appearance, in 
fact contained fireworks, which exploded upon impact with the 
ground.115 The plaintiff, a young woman who stood “many feet away” at 
the other end of the platform, was injured from the explosion.116 The 
plaintiff sued the railroad company for the negligence of the guard, and 
the court held that, while the guard owed a duty to the gentleman 
carrying the package, it was not foreseeable that the apparently harmless 
package “had in it the potency of peril to persons thus removed.”117 
Therefore, even though the plaintiff indeed suffered an injury because of 
the guard’s negligence, it was not foreseeable that his actions would 
cause harm to anyone other than the possessor of the package, and 
therefore he could not have breached a duty that he did not owe to the 
plaintiff.118 
While a potential victim of an automobile accident would be far 
removed from the source of the careless conduct similar to the plaintiff 
in Palsgraf, it is “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived [that] defines the 
duty to be obeyed.”119 In Palsgraf, the guard did not owe a duty to the 
plaintiff because it was not foreseeable ex ante that he would, by 
Jersey’s texting-while-driving statute).  
113. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001)
(“Cardozo’s achievement was to align the relational significance of risk, as a foreseeable effect on 
another, with the relational nature of tortious wrongdoing as the violation of the plaintiff’s right.”). 
114. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 340-41 (N.Y. 1928). 
115. Id. at 341. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 345 (“Negligence, like risk, is . . . a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract,
apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all.”). 
119. Id. at 344. 
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shoving the owner of the package, carelessly set in motion the series of 
events which caused a hidden but dangerous instrumentality to explode 
and injure the plaintiff.120 However, unlike the guard in Palsgraf, the 
sender of a text will be held liable only if he is aware that the recipient is 
driving an automobile that, when operated carelessly, can foreseeably 
cause substantial harm to others in the immediate proximity.121 Further, 
even though the instrumentalities in both cases are potentially 
dangerous, in the case of texting a driver it is foreseeable that an 
automobile, because of its known and dangerous potentialities, will give 
notice to the actor ex ante of the “risk reasonably to be perceived.”122 
Thus, because the sender of a text can perceive the risk to others when 
she sends a text knowing that the recipient is operating a dangerous 
instrumentality, it is not unfair to impose a duty upon the sender to 
refrain from engaging in an activity that has the potential to harm the 
public who use the roadways.123 
C. Proving Negligence of a Remote Text Sender Under Kubert124
There are essentially two prongs that must be satisfied regarding a
sender’s state of mind before the sending of a text may be considered a 
tortious action rendering the sender liable to a third party under 
Kubert.125 First, the sender must have known or had special reason to 
know that the recipient was driving at the time he sent the text.126 
Second, the sender must have known or had special reason to know that 
the driver is likely to view the message while driving.127 A plaintiff may 
120. Id. at 342 (“To the eye of ordinary vigilance, the bundle is abandoned waste, which may
be kicked or trod on with impunity.”). 
121. See id. at 344 (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”). 
122. Remote text senders should have notice that the recipient-driver is engaging in a
potentially dangerous activity since many States require that all drivers obtain automobile insurance. 
See, e.g., State v. McCourt, 131 N.J. Super. 283, 286 (App. Div. 1974) (“[T]he State requires an 
owner of a dangerous instrumentality such as an automobile, as a condition precedent to use the 
State’s highway, to ensure compensation for damages to others that may be sustained as a result 
thereof.”). 
123. Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 517 (App. Div. 2013) (explaining that it is not unfair 
to hold a sender responsible for distracting a driver when he or she knows that the recipient is 
driving and will read the text while driving). 
124. Although the court in Kubert referenced Section 303 of the Second Restatement of Torts
to reach its holding, the Third Restatement, as the most recent Restatement of Torts, will be used 
here as the model to demonstrate how Kubert could be applied in tort across jurisdictions, rather 
than limiting its application. 
125. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 519. 
126. Id.
127. Id. 
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potentially satisfy these prongs in several ways. For example, a plaintiff 
will likely need to prove that the sender knew that the recipient was 
likely to view the text from circumstantial evidence or because he had 
special reason to know based on prior experience, a personal relationship 
between the sender and driver, or “otherwise.”128 Because of the degree 
of interrelatedness between the prongs, it is likely that the evidence a 
plaintiff presents will be sufficient to satisfy both. 
There are several approaches in which a plaintiff might be able to 
satisfy either or both prongs under Kubert. Testimony may reveal that 
the sender knew that the recipient was likely to view the text and/or that 
the recipient was driving.129 Alternatively, the content of the exchange of 
texts between the sender and driver may be a reliable means of 
establishing that the sender both knew the recipient was driving and 
actually viewed the text based on a response to the sender’s text.130 Also, 
the plaintiff might present evidence that the sender knew, from prior 
experience, about the recipient’s habit of viewing texts while driving or 
of the recipient’s commuting habits.131 Finally, evidence of certain 
personal relationships should permit a factfinder to infer that the sender 
had “special reason to know” under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.132 
1. A Plaintiff May Prove a Sender’s Negligence by Offering the
Contents of the Relevant Exchange of Texts
Absent a “special reason to know” based on a personal relationship 
between sender and recipient, a plaintiff may, through discovery, offer 
evidence of a sender’s breach if the plaintiff obtains the content of the 
relevant exchange of texts between the sender and the recipient.133 
128. See id. at 517 (noting that “special reason to know” in the context of breach references a
“personal relationship,” “prior texting experience,” or “otherwise”). 
129. See id. at 520 (stating that while plaintiffs had presented testimony, it was insufficient to
establish that the defendant was aware that the driver would view the defendant’s text while 
driving).  
130. Julia Blackmon, Case Note, Oops, I Sent it Again!, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 59, 67
(2014) (“Had the plaintiffs been able to obtain and examine the messages [between the sender and 
driver], seconds before the [driver’s] accident, the plaintiffs might have been able to prove that [the 
sender] knew or had reason to know that the [recipient] was driving when she texted him.”).  
131. See, e.g., L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76, 89 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting N.J.R. EVID. 
406) (“Evidence, whether corroborated or not, of habit or routine practice is admissible to prove that 
on a specific occasion a person . . . acted in conformity with the habit or practice.”). 
132. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 517; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT.
HARM scope note to §§ 17-19 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that res ipsa loquitur can be seen 
as a rule of evidence based on circumstantial evidence which permits a plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant breached his duty). 
133. For example, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may generally “serve on
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Alternatively, if a plaintiff is unable to obtain the texts from the sender 
or recipient, the plaintiff may, perhaps with some difficulty, subpoena 
the messages directly from the cellular service provider.134 Indeed, in the 
federal district courts, case law concerning the discoverability of texts 
has yet to be developed.135 Nevertheless, assuming that texts may be 
discovered and admitted into evidence, a court would be tasked with 
determining whether the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the sender knew the recipient was 
driving and would view the incoming text.136 
Because the Kubert court held that the evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs was insufficient to hold the defendant-sender liable, there is an 
absence of precedent regarding the type of evidence that would be 
sufficient to prove that the sender knew the recipient was driving and 
would view the text.137 However, because the court does elaborate on the 
evidence insufficient to impose liability, the opinion may still offer 
guidance on the requisite evidence needed to prove breach.138 
Particularly, in Kubert, the plaintiffs presented evidence on the habits of 
the remote sender and recipient-driver regarding the frequent exchange 
of texts that occurred on the day of the incident.139 In addition, the court 
any other party a request . . . to produce and permit the requesting party to copy . . . electronically 
stored information . . . stored in any medium from which information can be obtained . . . .” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A).  
134. In order to obtain cell phone records from the telephone company, often not a party
to the litigation, the requesting party may be required to show special circumstances
which is not established merely upon a showing that the information sought is relevant;
rather, it must be demonstrated that the information sought cannot be obtained through
other sources such as the cell phone user.
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Civil Liability Arising from Use of Cell Phone While Driving, 36 A.L.R. 
6TH 443(2008). 
135. Erin M. Secord, Note, Exploring Challenges With the Discovery of Text Messages in
Federal Cases Through the Lens of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11, 15  SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 143, 163 (2010) 
(“Case law regarding text messages is largely undeveloped, leaving an expansive canvas upon 
which future courts may craft the jurisprudence in this area.”).  
136. See Juan A. Albino, Do Defendants Have a Privacy Interest in Their Cell Phone’s Text
Messages and E-mails?, 44 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE P.R. 383, 395 
(2009) (explaining that, under the federal rules of evidence, there are five hurdles that a party must 
overcome when offering texts as evidence: relevance, authenticity, hearsay, the “best evidence 
rule,” and probative value).  
137. Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 520 (App. Div. 2013) (“[The Kuberts] failed to
develop evidence tending to prove that [the sender] not only knew that [the recipient] was driving 
when she texted him . . . but that [the sender] knew [the driver] would violate the law and 
immediately view and respond to [the sender’s] text.”).  
138. See id. at 519-20.
139. Id. (“In this case, plaintiffs developed evidence pertaining to the habits of [the recipient]
and [the sender] in texting each other repeatedly. They also established that the day of the accident 
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reiterated that the defendant only sent one text to the recipient while he 
was driving, that the content of that text were unknown, and that there 
was an absence of testimony supporting the conclusion that the 
defendant knew the recipient was driving and would view the text.140 
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s evidence, which merely 
demonstrated a routine pattern of texting between the sender and 
recipient, was insufficient to prove that the sender knew the recipient 
was driving and would view the incoming text.141 
As Kubert demonstrates, it will likely be difficult for a plaintiff to 
prove a sender’s state of mind.142 State of mind is often proved by 
presenting circumstantial evidence, and in the case of proving that a 
remote sender knew whether the recipient would be driving and view a 
text, the most reliable evidence would likely be the content of the 
exchanged texts.143 For example, a recipient-driver who responds “I’m 
driving” should give the sender sufficient knowledge that the recipient is 
both driving and has viewed the sender’s text.144 Moreover, even if a 
recipient’s responsive text does not explicitly state that the recipient is 
driving, a plaintiff may nonetheless demonstrate that a sender should 
have at least had constructive knowledge based on the content of an 
earlier exchange of texts.145 Specifically, if a plaintiff submits evidence 
was not an unusual texting day for the two.”).  
140. Id. at 520 (“[Defendant] sent only one text while [the recipient] was driving. The contents 
of that text are unknown. No testimony established that she was aware [the recipient] would violate 
the law and read her text as he was driving, or that he would respond immediately.”). 
141. Id. (“The evidence of multiple texting at other times when [the recipient] was not driving 
did not prove that [the sender] breached the limited duty we have described.”). 
142. Cf. State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 551 (1986) (“[S]tate of mind is often the most difficult
element of a crime to prove because many crimes are unwitnessed and even if a witness is present, 
the witness can only surmise the actor’s state of mind.”); see also David P. Leonard, The Use of 
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge, 81 NEB. L. REV. 115, 122 (2002) 
(“[K]nowledge is an essential element or part of the mental element of some civil claims as 
well . . . .”).  
143. See Gray v. Press Commc’ns, LLC, 342 N.J. Super 1, 12 (App. Div. 2001) (citing
Costello v. Ocean Cty. Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 615 (1994)) (“Rarely will direct evidence be 
available to prove state of mind.”); see also Leonard, supra note 142, at 120 (“Because states of 
mind almost always must be proven circumstantially, courts have long been lenient in permitting all 
forms of evidence . . . to prove the mental state.”).  
144. See also Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 506 (noting that because the recipient sent a text back
to the sender less than a minute after the recipient received the sender’s text, it can be inferred that 
the recipient sent that text in response to the sender’s original text).  
145. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 452 (1984) (“Constructive knowledge 
embraces knowledge that should have been known based on information that was reasonably 
available or obtainable and should have alerted a reasonably prudent person to act.”). And, as 
Kubert teaches, merely offering evidence that demonstrates an earlier pattern of texting, without 
disclosing the content of those texts, cannot prove that a remote sender breached his or her duty. 
Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 506, 512, 519-20 (emphasizing that the content of the exchanged texts 
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of the content of an exchange of texts from an earlier date at a similar 
time of day where the recipient had previously responded by stating that 
he was driving, the factfinder should be permitted to infer that the sender 
should have known, based on prior knowledge, that the recipient was 
likely to be driving at that time and would view the text. 146 This 
inference should be more compelling if the content of the texts reveal 
that the recipient previously informed the sender of when the recipient 
was likely to be commuting.147 
On the other hand, a recipient who responds by texting “I can’t talk 
because I’m about to drive” may indicate that the sender did not know 
that the recipient was driving, even if she in fact was driving. Similarly, 
cell phone applications exist that will automatically respond to a text by 
informing the sender that the recipient is driving and cannot respond.148 
Thus, while such a response will give the sender notice that the recipient 
is driving, the use of this application may cause a factfinder to presume 
that the sender did not have knowledge that the recipient would view the 
incoming text.149 
2. A Factfinder Should Be Permitted to Infer a Remote Sender’s
Negligence under Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Kubert, because the plaintiffs could not obtain the content of the 
relevant text messages that were exchanged between the defendants, and 
because the defendant’s deposition concerning the content of the 
messages was taken sixteen months after the accident, the plaintiffs 
failed to establish that the defendant knew or had special reason to know 
was missing from the evidence).  
146. Leonard explains that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), in some cases “other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts” will demonstrate that the actor had knowledge at the time of the earlier 
crime, wrong, or act. Leonard, supra note 142, at 116, 124 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)). He 
further explains that the “fact-finder is then asked to infer that the individual retained that 
knowledge up to the time of the charged event.” Id. at 124. 
147. See id. (“In some cases, the inference of past knowledge, and in turn knowledge on the
occasion in question, will be very strong.”).  
148. For example, AT&T offers a smart-phone application that automatically responds to a
text message when the vehicle moves faster than 25 m.p.h., which informs the sender that the 
recipient is driving and cannot respond. AT&T, AT&T DriveMode Factsheet and Q&A, AT&T
(2013), https://www.att.com/Common/about_us/txting_driving/ att_drivemode_factsheet.pdf.  
149. See Andrew Oliva, Case Comment, Kubert v. Best et. al.: Massachusetts Ramifications of 
the Recent Remote Texting Liability Case in New Jersey, 1 BEARING WITNESS: J. ON LAW AND SOC.
RESP. 59, 60 (2013) (“[I]t is important to note that not only must the sender of the text message 
know that the recipient will read the message, but they must also know that the recipient will read it 
while driving.”). 
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that the recipient was both driving and would view the text message.150 
However, under res ipsa loquitur, even if the content of the texts cannot 
be obtained, a plaintiff should nonetheless be entitled to an inference that 
the sender breached his duty based on certain special relationships 
between the sender and the driver because it should have given the 
sender “special reason to know.”151 Moreover, application of res ipsa 
loquitur would not be unfair in this context because the content of the 
texts might be difficult to obtain; thus, it will encourage the defendant to 
disclose this crucial evidence, which might rebut the inference and bar 
the plaintiff’s res ipsa loquitur claim.152 
In a jurisdiction applying the Third Restatement’s formulation of 
res ipsa loquitur, “The factfinder may infer that the defendant has been 
negligent when the accident causing the plaintiff’s harm is a type of 
accident that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a class of 
actors of which the defendant is the relevant member.”153 In an action 
against a text sender, this suggests that the class of actors of which the 
defendant is a relevant member should constitute text senders who 
possess a personal or special relationship with the recipient driver.154 
Further, the Third Restatement explains that “[a]n actor in a special 
relationship with another owes a duty . . . to third parties with regard to 
risks posed by the other that arise within the scope of the 
150. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 506-7 (“[T]he necessary evidence to prove breach of the
remote texter’s duty is absent on this record . . . .”).  
151. See id. at 517 (noting that when the sender has “special reason to know” that the driver
will view the text based on a “personal relationship,” he has breached his duty of care by distracting 
the driver because he was in a position to discover the risk of harm).  
152. See, e.g., United States v. Ridolfi, 318 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1963) (explaining that when 
res ipsa loquitur is applied, the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence to 
demonstrate that the accident was not due to his or her fault); see also Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 
175, 192 (2005) (citing Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 289 (1984)) (“[Res ipsa] 
places a strong incentive on the party with superior knowledge to explain the cause of an accident 
and to come forward with evidence in its defense.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & 
EMOT. HARM § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“In at least a few jurisdictions, res ipsa loquitur creates a 
rebuttable presumption, thereby requiring the defendant to come forward with some exculpatory 
evidence or suffer a judgment as a matter of law.”). 
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
154. The Third Restatement states that “[i]n limited circumstances . . . [i]f two parties have an
ongoing relationship pursuant to which they share responsibility for a dangerous activity, and if an 
accident happens establishing the negligence of one of the two, imposing res ipsa loquitur liability 
on both is proper.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. f (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010). While it may ordinarily be the case that only the recipient-driver engages in a 
dangerous activity by texting and driving, he cannot do so without the participation of the remote 
text sender. Thus, because a remote sender may also be potentially held liable for the dangerous 
activity of texting and driving under Kubert, if the sender and recipient have an “ongoing 
relationship,” imposing res ipsa loquitur liability on both would be proper. See Kubert, 432 N.J. 
Super. at 503. 
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relationship.”155 Under Kubert, a personal relationship between the 
sender and recipient gives the sender “special reason to know,” which 
puts the sender “in a position to discover the risk of harm.”156 Thus, if a 
sender has a special relationship with the recipient whom the sender 
knows is driving, the sender has special reason to know that sending a 
text might interfere with the driver’s operation of the vehicle and the 
sender must take reasonable steps to prevent the driver from causing an 
accident by not sending the text.157 
In addition to the evidence presented by a plaintiff, the jury should 
be permitted to supplement its understanding of whether the defendant 
was in a position to discover the risk of harm with its “general 
experience” and “common knowledge.”158 Thus, juries should be 
entitled to apply their own experiences because both texting and driving 
are commonplace activities and most jurors are more than likely familiar 
with the associated risks when a person engages in both 
simultaneously.159 
Further, the Third Restatement supports the principle that a remote 
text sender owes an independent duty to third-party motorists when the 
remote text sender has a “special reason to know” based on a personal 
relationship with the driver by listing several relationships that are 
sufficient to impose this duty.160 Specifically, relationships between 
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
Section 41 is entitled “Duty to Third Parties Based on Special Relationship with Person Posing 
Risks” and sets forth special relationships that will give rise to a duty to third parties, including “a 
parent with dependent children” and “an employer with employees.” Id.  
156. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 517; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. 
HARM § 41 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (noting that the “duty imposed . . . subjects an actor to 
liability for the actor’s own tortious conduct”). 
157. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 518 (noting that text senders will be held liable “for their own
negligence when they have knowingly disregarded a foreseeable risk of serious injury to others”); 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“If 
the other person poses a risk of harm to third parties, the actor must take reasonable steps, in light of 
the foreseeable probability and magnitude of any harm, to prevent it from occurring.”).  
158. See, e.g., Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 527 (1981) (reaffirming the proposition
that a jury may be entitled to conclude from “common knowledge” that the plaintiff would not have 
been injured but for the defendant’s failure to adhere to its appropriate standard of conduct); see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“In 
some cases, the jury can derive its understanding of the circumstances that cause a particular type of 
accident from . . . general experience [and] common knowledge.”). 
159. See Kahn v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 92 (N.J. 2009) (noting that the original basis for res ipsa
loquitur is found in cases that rest on common knowledge); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Such experience and knowledge is 
especially available and helpful when the type of accident is one with which ordinary citizens are 
generally familiar.”). 
160. Thus, “If the actor neither knows nor should know of a risk of harm, no action [or
inaction] is required.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
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parent and minor child and between employer and employee should 
impose a duty on parents and employers not to send a text because they 
are more likely to be familiar with the recipient’s schedule and their 
habits while driving, which should give them special reason to know that 
the minor child or employee would be driving and would view the 
sender’s text while driving.161 Similarly, a relationship between spouses 
could fit into this category, because, like the aforementioned 
relationships, there is “some degree of control over the other person.”162 
Accordingly, if a sender has a special relationship with the recipient, the 
sender is within the “class of actors” for purposes of res ipsa loquitur, 
and the factfinder should be permitted to infer that the sender was 
negligent because he has special reason to know that the recipient was 
driving.163 
a. Employer and Employee Relationship
Under an employer-employee relationship, and particularly when 
the employee is acting within the scope of the employment, an employer 
is likely to know whether an employee is driving.164 Further, it is not 
unlikely that an employer might expect the employee to promptly 
respond, especially while the employee is “on the clock” or acting within 
the scope of his employment.165 Thus, employees under time constraints 
INST. 2012). 
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. d-e (AM. LAW INST.
2012) (noting that the basis for the employer’s duty in relation to the employee is the employer’s 
“hiring, training, supervision, and retention of employees”); see also id. (“The basis of the parents’ 
duty with regard to dependent children is the parents’ responsibility for child-rearing [and] their 
control over their children . . . .”). 
162. Cf. Wagner v. Schlue, 255 N.J. Super. 391, 395 (Law Div. 1992) (holding a husband
liable for third party’s injuries caused by his wife after he permitted her to drive intoxicated); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012) 
(noting that these special relationships impose a duty because the “actor has some degree of control 
over the other person”).  
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 (AM. LAW INST.
2012) (noting that this section is not limited to acts of the employee that are outside of the scope of 
employment).  
165. However, an employer may be able to rebut the inference that the employer had “special 
reason to know” that the employee would view an incoming text if the employer has a specific 
policy against texting and driving. See Isaac A. Hof, Comment, Wake-up Call: Eliminating the 
Major Roadblock that Cell Phone Driving Creates for Employer Liability, 84 TEMP. L.R. 701, 735 
(2012) (arguing that one factor that courts may look to in determining whether the employer may 
avoid being directly liable is whether an employer has an existing cell phone policy). For example, 
some employers, such as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, prohibit motor carriers 
from requiring or allowing drivers to text and drive while in interstate commerce and impose 
penalties for violations of the rule. Limiting the use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. 
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may feel pressured or even obligated to immediately respond to their 
employer’s text or email. Further, a plaintiff may enhance his argument 
that the employer had a higher expectation of a timely response if it can 
be shown that the employer provided an employee with a work-specific 
cell phone or condoned the use of a cell phone while driving.166 This 
type of pressured communication fits squarely within the permissive 
scope of Kubert, which holds that the remote employer-sender can be 
liable not for actually obstructing a driver’s view, but for merely urging 
that the driver view a cell phone because the employer-sender has 
special reason to know, based on the existence of an employer-employee 
relationship, that the driver will become distracted.167 
b. Parent and Minor Child Relationship
Similar to an employer-employee relationship, a parent is likely to 
know the whereabouts of the child, and particularly, whether the child is 
driving.168 In the context of proving a parent-sender’s negligence, 
parents should have “special reason to know” based on the parent-child 
relationship, which exists because the parent has some degree of control 
over the conduct of child, which serves as the basis for imposing 
liability.169 Specifically, parents maintain control of the child because, 
especially at remote locations, parents often tend to expect an immediate 
response from their child. It follows that based on this expectation, the 
child might feel pressured to respond immediately. Thus, when a parent 
sends a text to his child whom he knows is driving, it can be said that the 
parent exerts control by “urging” the child to view and respond to the 
message, thereby distracting the child.170 In effect, while a parent-child 
Reg. 59118, 59118 (Oct. 27, 2010); see also Prohibition Against Texting, 49 C.F.R § 392.80 (2016).  
166. See Hof, supra note 165 (arguing that courts should look to whether the employer
“encouraged or required employees to use cell phones for work-related purposes while driving” in 
determining whether an employer has breached its duty to the public); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (noting that the duty of 
employers also “extends to conduct by the employee . . . when the employment facilitates the 
employee causing harm to others”). 
167. See Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 516 (App. Div. 2013) (“[I]f the sender knows
that the recipient is both driving and will read the text . . . the sender has knowingly engaged in 
distracting conduct.”). 
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(noting that, for the parent to be held liable, there must “be some specific propensity of the child, of 
which the parent has notice”).  
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2012) 
(“The basis of the parents’ duty with regard to dependent children is the parents’ responsibility for 
child-rearing [and] their control over their children . . . .”). 
170. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 516, 518 (stating that text senders, who have a similar duty 
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relationship might not offer direct evidence of whether a parent knew 
that his child would view the message while driving, it should permit the 
factfinder to infer that the parent had a special reason to know that the 
child would view the text and become distracted.171 
In sum, even if the plaintiff is unable to obtain the content of the 
relevant exchange of texts, the factfinder should nonetheless be 
permitted to infer a sender’s negligence if the plaintiff can demonstrate 
that the sender, because of the sender’s relationship with the recipient, 
had special reason to know that the recipient would view the text and 
thus become distracted.172 
D. Imposing a Duty on Remote Text Senders May Implicate Several
Issues
Holding senders of text messages liable may implicate insurance-
related issues. For example, if a sender is held liable, he might attempt to 
shield his personal assets by filing an insurance claim, but because no 
insurance provider offers a policy that specifically covers liabilities 
associated with texting, senders might attempt to file claims under 
existing policies.173 Thus, unless the standard for holding a text sender 
liable is onerous, the insurance industry may experience a headache 
from the flood of unrelated insurance claims filed by defendant text 
senders.174 
Because some states may not be prepared to permit a plaintiff to 
recover against a text sender, thereby depriving the sender of his 
personal assets for sending a text, courts should be reluctant to lower the 
to passengers, may be held liable by “urging” a driver to remove his or her gaze from the road if 
they have special reason to know that “the driver will in fact be distracted and drive negligently as a 
result . . .”).  
171. This inference merely serves as an alternative theory for imposing liability on the parent
for the child’s negligent driving. For example, Kentucky has adopted a statute that imputes a child’s 
negligent driving on the “motor vehicle owner who causes or knowingly permits a minor under the 
age of eighteen . . . to drive,” which in many cases is likely to be the parent. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
186.590 (West 2016) (imputing joint and several liability also on the person who “signed the 
application” of the minor’s license allowing him or her to drive).  
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. j (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010) (noting that a jury will receive a res ipsa loquitur instruction if “reasonable minds can 
infer that the accident is of the type that usually happens because of the negligence of the class of 
actors to which the defendant belongs”).   
173. On the other hand, imposing liability on a remote text sender may serve as an opportunity 
for insurers to offer policy riders to cover potential liability associated with texting. See Oliva, supra 
note 149 (“It is possible that insurance contracts insuring the operator of a motor vehicle could 
include provisions agreeing to represent remote parties that the operator is texting . . . .”). 
174. Id. (noting that Kubert’s holding will likely result in increased litigation).
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threshold when holding a text sender liable.175 Indeed, for a sender to 
have breached his duty to the public and specifically the potential victim, 
courts should consider raising the burden of proof from a preponderance 
standard to requiring that the victim prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the sender knew or had special reason to know that the 
recipient was driving and would view the incoming text.176 Otherwise, 
not only will the floodgate be opened to a substantial increase in 
litigation, whether meritorious or not, the deep pocket problem would 
hold ordinary persons’ assets liable and likely overwhelm the insurance 
industry as a whole with its own flood of insurance claims. 
Another potential issue with imposing liability on remote text 
senders is that furthering the prohibition on texting and driving may 
actually increase accidents caused by texting and driving because if the 
driver knows that the activity is banned, he might attempt to hide the 
activity by holding his phone below his line of sight, which may cause 
him to hold his gaze from the road for an even longer period of time.177 
This distraction may last long enough to significantly slow down a 
person’s reaction time and increase the possibility of an accident.178 
V. CONCLUSION
Texting and driving is a dangerous activity that is responsible for 
many of the avoidable accidents that occur due to distracted driving.179 
While many state legislatures have responded by enacting formal 
prohibitions on texting and driving, the penalties are far less severe than 
other forms of distracted driving, namely driving while intoxicated.180 
175. See id. 
176. The clear and convincing evidence standard is a higher standard of proof but a lower
standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 169 
(2006) (citing Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super 156, 162 (App. Div. 1960)). Specifically, 
“The clear and convincing standard should produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or 
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. (citing In re Purrazzella, 
134 N.J. 228, 240 (1993)).  
177. See Highway Loss Data Institute, Texting Laws and Collision Claim Frequencies (2010) 
(explaining that this unexpected consequence to laws banning texting while driving may make 
texting and driving more dangerous if it causes drivers to take their eyes off the road more 
frequently than before the ban was enacted). 
178. See Quisenberry, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
179. For example, in 2013, cell phone related accidents constituted 27 percent of all
automobile accidents. Annual Estimate of Cell Phone Crashes 2013, supra note 4.  
180. For example, in New Jersey the penalty for a first offense for texting and driving is a
monetary fine between $200 and $400. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3(d) (West 2015). In contrast, 
depending on the offender’s blood alcohol concentration, a first offender convicted of driving while 
intoxicated is subject to a mandatory operator’s license forfeiture, imposition of an ignition 
interlock, a fine between $250 and $500, and a mandatory period of detainment. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
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Because the penalties for many states and localities usually consist of a 
small monetary fine, the deterrent effect on the conduct of drivers is 
minimal.181 Thus, this approach to reducing texting while driving only 
addresses one-half of the prohibited conduct. 
While prohibiting texting and driving on the part of the recipient-
driver is the more obvious approach to addressing the issue, the very 
nature of texting requires the participation of two individuals, which 
suggests that the text sender’s conduct should also be addressed. The 
framework that Kubert has formulated appropriately addresses the issue 
of texting and driving by imposing a duty on the remote sender to refrain 
from texting in inappropriate circumstances.182 Because the threshold of 
proving that a remote text sender has breached his duty is higher than 
ordinary standards of conduct, Kubert’s holding offers a realistic 
approach to reducing incidences of texting while driving.183 It also 
forces society to re-examine how drivers should use electronic devices 
when operating an automobile. Accordingly, state courts and legislatures 
should impose a duty on remote text senders, consistent with the holding 
in Kubert, to not send a text to a recipient whom they know is driving 
and is likely to become distracted by the incoming text.184 
39:4-50(a) (West 2015). 
181. See Highway Loss Data Institute, supra note 177 (“[M]ost importantly for policy makers,
laws banning [cell phone conversations and texting] are not reducing crash risk in the United 
States.”).   
182. Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2013). 
183. Id. at 520 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“[T]he bar set by the majority for the imposition of
liability is high and will rarely be met.”).  
184. See id. at 503 (majority opinion).
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